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ABSTRACT
Spam phone calls have been rapidly growing from nuisance to an
increasingly effective scam delivery tool. To counter this increas-
ingly successful attack vector, a number of commercial smartphone
apps that promise to block spam phone calls have appeared on app
stores, and are now used by hundreds of thousands or even millions
of users. However, following a businessmodel similar to some online
social network services, these apps often collect call records or other
potentially sensitive information from users’ phones with little or
no formal privacy guarantees.
In this paper, we study whether it is possible to build a practi-
cal collaborative phone blacklisting system that makes use of local
differential privacy (LDP)mechanisms to provide clear privacy guar-
antees. We analyze the challenges and trade-offs related to using
LDP, evaluate our LDP-based system on real-world user-reported
call records collected by the FTC, and show that it is possible to learn
a phone blacklist using a reasonable overall privacy budget and at
the same time preserve users’ privacy while maintaining utility for
the learned blacklist.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Spam phone calls have been rapidly growing from nuisance to
supporting well-coordinating fraudulent campaigns [4, 15, 18]. To
counter this increasingly successful attack vector, federal agencies
such as the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have been working
with telephone carriers to design systems for blocking robocalls (i.e.,
automated calls) [12, 13]. At the same time, a number of smartphone
apps that promise to block spam phone calls have appeared on app
stores [25, 26, 31], and smartphone vendors, such as Google [16], are
embedding some spam blocking functionalities into their default
phone apps.
Currently, most spam blocking apps rely on caller ID blacklisting,
whereby calls from phone numbers that are known to have been
involved in spamming or numerous unwanted calls are blocked (ei-
ther automatically, or upon explicit user consent). Recently, Pandit
et al. [23] have studied how to learn such blacklists from a variety
of data sources, including user complaints, phone honeypot call de-
tail records (CDRs) and call recordings. Existing commercial apps,
such as Youmail [31] and TouchPal [21], mostly base their blocking
approach on user complaints. Other popular apps, such as True-
Caller [26], also use information collected from users’ contact lists
to distinguish between possible legitimate and unknown/unwanted
calls1. However, in the recent past TrueCaller has experienced signif-
icant backlash due to privacy concerns related to the sharing of users’
contact listswith a centralized service. Google recently implemented
a built-in feature in Android phones to protect against possible spam
calls. Nonetheless, Android phones may send information about
received calls to Google without strong privacy guarantees [16].
While learning a blacklist from CDRs collected by phone honey-
pots [23] is a promising approach that poses little or no privacy risks,
it suffers from some drawbacks. First, operating a phone honeypot
is expensive, as thousands of phone numbers have to be acquired
from telephone carriers. Furthermore, in [23] it has been reported
that the spam calls targeting the honeypot were skewed towards
business-oriented campaigns, likely because the honeypot num-
bers were mostly re-purposed business numbers (perhaps because
re-purposing a user’s number may pose some privacy risks, since
others might still try to reach a specific person at that number). Con-
versely, leveraging user complaints also has some drawbacks. For
instance, for a user to be able to complain or label a number (as in
TouchPal [21]), the user has to answer to and identify the purpose
of the call. However, only a fraction of users typically answers and
listens to calls from unknown numbers (i.e., numbers not registered
in the contact list). Furthermore, user-provided call labels are quite
noisy and a relatively high number of complaints about the same
number need to be observed, before being able to accurately label
the source of the calls [21]. This may delay the insertion of a spam
number into the blacklist, thus leaving open a time window for the
spammers to succeed in their campaigns.
One possible solution would be to use an approach similar to the
CDR-based blacklisting proposed in [23], while using real phone
numbers as “live honeypots.” In other words, if a smartphone app
could leverage the call logs of real phone users without requiring the
users to explicitly label the phone calls, this would provide a solution
1These behavior are inferredmerely from publicly available information; further details
on the inner-workings of commercial apps are difficult to obtain and their technical
approach cannot be fully evaluated for comparison.
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Figure 1: System overview. Caller IDs are collected with local differential
privacy. After learning, blacklist updates are propagated back to users.
to the drawbacks mentioned above. Unfortunately, this may obvi-
ously pose serious privacy risks to users. For instance, knowing that
a user received a phone call from a specific phone number related to
a cancer treatment clinic may reveal that the user (or a close family
member) is a cancer patient.
ResearchQuestion:Can these privacy concerns bemitigated, and
the users’ call logs be collaboratively contributed to enable learning an
accurate phone blacklist with strong privacy guarantees?
To answer the above research question, in this paper we study
whether it is possible to design a practical phone blacklisting system
that leverages differential privacy [7] mechanisms to collaboratively
learn effective anti-spam phone blacklists while providing strong
privacy guarantees. Specifically, we leverage a state-of-the art local
differential privacy (LDP) mechanisms for generic heavy-hitter de-
tection that has been shown to work only in theory [3], and focus
on adapting it to enable the implementation of a concrete privacy-
preserving collaborative blacklist learning system that could be
deployed on real smartphone devices. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to study the application of local differential privacy to
building blacklist-based defenses, and specifically towards defenses
against telephony spam.
Figure 1 shows an overview of our system. Participating users in-
stall an app that can implement the following high-level functionali-
ties (moredetails about theclient appareprovided inSection5):when
the user receives a call, the appwill first check if the caller ID (i.e., the
calling number) is in the users’ contacts list; if yes, the caller ID is con-
sidered as trusted and ignored, otherwise the caller ID is considered
to be unknown and buffered for reporting. Unknown caller IDs are
then checked against a blacklist; if a match is found, the user can be
alerted that the incoming phone call originates fromaphone number
known to have been involved in spamming activities, so that the user
can decide whether to reject the call. At the end of a predefined time
window(e.g., oncedaily), theappwill reportunknowncaller IDs from
which the user received a phone call (including bothunanswered and
accepted calls). Consequently, the server will receive daily reports
from each user, which consist of the list of unknown caller IDs ob-
served by the client apps running on each device. As we will explain
in Section 5, all the caller IDs are delivered by the client apps to the
server via a novel LDPmechanism. This is done to provide privacy
guarantees andminimize the risk of the server learning any sensitive
information about single users’ phone calls (e.g., whether the user
may be a cancer patient, given that she has received calls from a
cancer treatment clinic). At the same time, while the users’ privacy is
protected, the server is able to identify heavy hitter caller IDs that are
highly likely associated with new spamming activities. Hence, our
system preserves user privacy by making it difficult for the server to
learn the list of caller IDs that are contacting the users, while keeping
its capability of building a blacklist of possible spammers.
While LDPmechanisms provide strong privacy guarantees, they
are often studied in theoretical terms and their applicability to practi-
cal, real-world security problems is often left as a secondary consider-
ation. On the contrary, in this paper we focus primarily on adapting
a state-of-the-art LDP mechanism for heavy hitter detection [3]
to make it practical, so that it can be used in the smartphone app
described above to report the list of caller IDs to the server. Further-
more, we evaluate the ability of the server to accurately reconstruct
the (noisy) reported caller IDs under different privacy budgets, and
evaluate theutility of the learnedblacklist. To this end,we implement
both the client-side (i.e., smartphone side) and server-side (i.e., black-
list learning side) LDP protocol, leaving other app implementation
details (e.g., user preferences and controls) to future work.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We explore how to build a privacy-preserving collaborative
phone blacklisting system using local differential privacy
(LDP). Specifically, we expose what are the challenges related
to building a practical LDP-based system that is able to learn
a phone blacklist from caller ID data provided by a pool of
contributing users, and propose a number of approaches to
overcome these challenges. To the best of our knowledge, our
system is the first application of LDP protocols to building a
defense against phone spam.
• We implement our blacklisting system using a new LDP pro-
tocol for heavy hitter detection. Our protocol is built upon a
state-of-the-art protocol previously proposed in [3]. We first
show that [3] is not practical, in that it cannot be applied as is
to collaborative phone blacklisting. We then introduce novel
LDP protocol modifications, such as data bucketization and
variance-reduction mechanisms, to enable heavy hitter de-
tection by building a LDP-based phone blacklisting approach
that could be deployed on real smartphones.
• We evaluate our LDP-based system on real-world user re-
ported call records collected by the FTC. Specifically, we an-
alyze multiple different trade-offs, including the trade-off
between the privacy budget assigned to the different compo-
nents of our LDP protocol and the overall blacklist learning
accuracy. Our results indicate that it is possible to learn a
phone blacklist using a reasonable overall privacy budget,
and to preserve users’ privacy while maintaining utility for
the learned blacklist.
2 PROBLEMDEFINITIONANDAPPROACH
In this section, we outline our threat model and briefly describe
our approach towards collaboratively building phone blacklists in
a privacy-preserving way.
Threat Model In designing our phone blacklisting system (see Fig-
ure 1), we make the following assumptions:
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• We consider the caller ID related to phone calls received by
users as privacy sensitive (e.g., see the cancer clinic example
given in Section 1). However, we do not consider the caller ID
area code prefix (e.g., the first three digit of a US phone num-
ber) as sensitive. The reason is that each area code includes
millions of possible phone numbers (e.g., 107 numbers in the
US). Therefore, even if the attacker learns that a given user
received a phone call from a given area code prefix, shewould
be faced with very high uncertainty regarding what specific
number actually called the user.
• We assume the privacy-preserving data collection app run-
ning on each user’s device is trusted. Namely, we assume the
app correctly implements our proposed LDP protocol (de-
tailed in Algorithm 2), and that it does not directly collect
and report any other user data to the server other than the
unknown phone numbers fromwhich calls were received.
• We also assume that the server correctly executes the server-
side of our LDP protocol, to learn a useful phone blacklist that
can be propagated back to the users to help them block future
spam calls. At the same time, we assume that the server may
at some point be compromised (or subpoenaed), allowing an
adversary to access future users’ reports. Unlike traditional
curator-based differential privacy mechanisms, our use of
LDPmechanisms guarantees that, in the event of a breach of
the server, the privacy of users’ phone call records can still
be preserved (see Section 3, for details).
It is worth noting that the server may be able to observe the IP
address of each reporting device. Furthermore, in a practical de-
ployment, the server may realistically implement an authentication
mechanism that requires users to register to the blacklisting service
(e.g., by providing an email address, password, etc.), to be allowed
to (privately) report call records and receive blacklist updates. In
this case, the identity of the users may be known to the server, and a
server breach may expose such identities. However, in this paperwe
focus exclusively on protecting the privacy of users’ phone call records,
rather thananonymity.Protecting the IPaddress and identityofusers
may be achieved via other security mechanisms that are outside the
scope of this work.
ApproachOverviewAccording to recent work on phone blacklist-
ing [22, 23], it is clear that most spammers will tend to call a large
number of users, in an attempt to identify a subset of them who
may fall for a scam. Therefore, given a large and distributed user
population, it is reasonable to consider heavy hitters as candidate
spammers. In other words, a caller ID that is reported as unknown
by a significant fraction of participating smartphones satisfies the
volume and diversity features used in previous work [22, 23], and
can be considered for blacklisting.
Following the high-level approach proposed in previouswork, we
therefore cast the problem of learning a phone blacklist as a heavy
hitter detection problem. The main research question we investigate
in this paper is the following: using the systemdepicted in Figure 1, is
it possible to accuratelydetect heavyhitter caller IDswhile providing
local differential privacy guarantees?
To investigate the above research question, we start from a state-
of-the-art LDP protocol for heavy hitter detection proposed by Bass-
ily andSmith [3],which throughout the rest of the paperwewill refer
to as SH (short for succinct histogram). Unfortunately, we have found
that the SH protocol is not suitable as is for providing a solution to
our application scenario (explained in details in Section 4). Among
the main issues we found is the fact that SH tends to work well only
in expectation. As we aim to build a practical blacklisting system, we
would likeour systemtoperformwell for realistic, limitedpopulation
sizes (e.g., thousands of users). Furthermore, the protocol used in [3]
for calculating the frequency of occurrence for a heavy hitter (i.e.,
the number of callsmade by a likely spammer, in our case) is complex
and difficult to implement efficiently (to the best of our knowledge,
no implementation of the full [3] protocol is publicly available).
To address the above limitations of the SH protocol, we introduce
three LDP protocol modifications:
(1) We propose a novel response randomizer that has the effect
of reducing the variance in the noisy inputs received by the
server-side of the SH protocol, thus increasing server-side
heavy hitter reconstruction accuracy even in the case of a
limited user population (Section 4).
(2) Second, we replace the frequency oracle part of the SH pro-
tocol proposed in [3] with a much simpler protocol recently
proposed in [28], whose implementation is publicly available
(Section 3.4).
(3) To increase the relative frequency of heavy hitter caller IDs
and boost the likelihood that the server will be able to cor-
rectly reconstruct them and add them to the blacklist, we
introduce a bucketization mechanism. In essence, before a
user (more precisely, the app running on the user’s phone)
reports one or more caller IDs to the server, the caller IDs are
first grouped according to their three-digit area code. Then,
the client-side portionof the SHprotocol is run independently
per each single group (i.e., per each area code). The intuition
here is that some spammers tend to use phone numbers from
specific area codes. For instance, IRS phone scams are often
performed using caller IDs with a 202 prefix (Washington DC
area code), as this may trick more users into believing it is
truly the IRS that is calling. By grouping caller IDs based on
area code, spam numbers also tend to group, increasing their
relative frequency compared to all other caller IDs with the
same prefix. This effect is discussed in details in Section C.
Section 4 presents the details of our LDP protocol.
Caller ID Spoofing Caller ID spoofing is the main limiting factor
for the effectiveness of phone blacklists in general, as also acknowl-
edged in previous work [21, 23]. Previous research on phone black-
listing [21, 23] regards the prevention of caller ID spoofing as an
orthogonal research direction, leaving it to future work. This choice
can be justified by noting that the FCC has mandated that all US
phone companies must implement caller ID authentication by June
30, 2021 [11]. In response, telephone carriers have started activating
an authentication protocol known as SHAKEN/STIR [15]. In our
work, wemake similar considerations as in previouswork, and focus
ourattentiononthe feasibilityofbuildingphoneblacklistsusinguser-
provided datawith strong privacy guarantees.We therefore consider
dealing with caller ID spoofing to be outside the scope of this paper.
3
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 Notation
Suppose there aren users, and that eachuser j holds an itemvj drawn
from a domainV of size d (in our case,V is the set of valid phone
numbers). For each itemv ∈V , its frequency f (v) is defined as the
fraction of users who holdv , i.e., f (v)= |{j ∈ [n] :vj =v}|/n, where
[n] denotes the set {1,2,...,n}. For notational simplicity, we omit the
subscript j when it’s clear from the context.
A frequency oracle (FO) is a function that can (privately) estimate
the frequency of any itemv ∈V among the user population.
For a vector x= (x1,...,xm ), we will use the array index notation
x[i] to denote the ith entry, i.e., x[i]=xi . Similarly,X[i,j] denotes the
entry at location (i,j) for a matrixX.
3.2 Local Differential Privacy
Differential privacy can be applied to two different settings: cen-
tralized and local. In the centralized setting, it is assumed that there
exists a trusted data curatorwho collects personal data v= (v1,...,vn )
from users, analyzes it, and releases the results after applying a dif-
ferentially private transformation. On the other hand, in the local
setting there is no single trusted third party. To protect privacy, each
user independently perturbs her recordvj into v˜j =A(vj ) using a
randomized algorithm A, and only shares the perturbed version
with an aggregator (the centralized server responsible for blacklist
learning, in our application). The local differential privacy (LDP)
model provides stronger privacy protection than the centralized
model, because it protects privacy even when the aggregator (i.e.,
the blacklist learning server, in our case) is compromised and con-
trolled by an adversary. The level of privacy protection depends on
a privacy budget parameter ε , as formally defined in [6]; the smaller
ε , the greater the privacy guarantees.
3.3 The Succinct Histogram Protocol
Bassily and Smith [3] proposed an ε-LDP protocol, called Succinct
Histogram (SH), for detecting heavy hitters over a large domainV .
In their work, the authors assume that each user has a single item
to share with the server.
Unfortunately, in [3] the client- and server-side of the protocol are
presented as “interleaved” in a single algorithm, and to the best of our
knowledge a practical implementation of the client-server protocol
was not provided. To make the LDP protocol in [3] practical and
applicable to our collaborative blacklist learning system, we provide
a new but equivalent representation of the protocol proposed in [3]
that focuses on the interactions between clients (i.e., the system
contributors) and server. Due to space limitations, we report our new
client-server formulation in Appendix A (see Algorithms 6 and 7).
The SH protocol works as follows. First, each user j ∈ [n] en-
codes her item vj ∈V into a bit string of lengthm using a binary
error-correcting code (Enc,Dec)2. For notational simplicity, we let
Enc(·)=c(·). Letxj ∈ {−1/√m,1/√m}m be the encoded binary string.
2Specifically, the protocol requires a [2m,k,d ]2 binary error-correcting code, where
2m , k , and d represent the codeword length, encoded message length (in bits), and
minimum distance, respectively, in which the relative distanced/2m has to be included
in the interval (0,1/2).
Algorithm 1: Rbas(x,ε): ε-Basic Randomizer
Input:m-bit string x, privacy budget ε
1 Sample r←[m] uniformly at random.
2 if x,0 then
3 zr =
{
c ·m ·xr w.p. eεeε +1
−c ·m ·xr w.p. 1eε +1
, where c = e
ε +1
eε −1 .
4 else
5 Choose zr uniformly from {c√m,−c√m }
6 return z= (0, ...,0,zr ,0, ...,0)
The encoded item xj and its decoding are respectively given by
xj =Enc(vj )=c(vj ) andDec(xj )=vj .
For privacy, eachuser j perturbsxj into a noisy report zj =Rbas(xj ,ε)
using a randomizerRbas and sends it to the server. The pseudo-code
of randomizer Rbas is described in Algorithm 1.
To simplify the heavy hitter detection problem, Bassily and Smith
applied the idea of isolating heavy hitters into different channels
using a pairwise independent hash functionH :V→[K], whereby
an itemv is mapped to channelH (v).
This has the effect that, with high probability, no two unique
heavy hitter items are mapped to the same channel (whenK is suf-
ficiently large). For each channel , users with H (vj ) = v∗ encode
vj into xj =Enc(vj ) and send the perturbed version of xj ; whereas
xj =0 for users withH (vj ),v∗ and Rbas(0) is reported to the server.
Given a set of noisy reports {z1,...,zn } collected from n users, the
server aggregates them to z¯ (line 6 in Algorithm 7, in Appendix),
rounds it to the nearest valid encoding y (line 7-8 in Algorithm 7,
in Appendix), and finally reconstructs the heavy hitter item by de-
coding it into vˆ=Dec(y). To estimate the frequency of vˆ , the server
collects another set of noisy reports {w1,...,wn } and estimates the
frequency as follows:
fˆ (vˆ)= ⟨ 1
n
n∑
j=1
wj ,c(vˆ)⟩= 1
n
n∑
j=1
wj [r j ]·q[r j ],
where q=c(vˆ).
To filter out possible false positives, similarly to the previous
phase the server collects noisy reportswj from users and aggregates
them in a single bitstringw. For each reconstructed value vˆ in Γ, its
frequency f (vˆ) is estimated using a frequency oracle (FO) function.
If the computed estimate fˆ (vˆ) is less than a threshold η, then vˆ is
removed from Γ. After this filtering phase, the server can then return
the set of detected heavy hitters.
The threshold η plays a crucial role in the heavy hitter detection:
η=
2T +1
ε
√
log(d)log(1/β)
n
(1)
where β [3] is a parameter related to the confidence the server has
on the heavy hitters it has detected. The same parameter β also
influences the number of protocol rounds,T [3].
We now analyze the properties of the basic randomizer. It is easy
to see that for every encoded item x∈ { 1√
m
,− 1√
m
}m∪{0} its noisy
reportw= (w1,...,wm ) is an unbiased estimator of x. For users with
x,0 and an integer r ∈ [m],
E[wr ]=cm
( eε
eε +1−
1
eε +1
)
xr =m ·xr and
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E[w]= 1
m
(E[w1],...,E[wm ])⊺ =x.
For users with x=0, E[wr ]=0 for ∀r ∈ [m], and hence E[w]=0=x.
It is also easy to see that forv ∈V the estimated frequency fˆ (v) has
the following properties (see Appendix B for details):
E[ fˆ (v)]= f (v)
and
Var( fˆ (v))= 1
n
{(
eε +1
eε −1
)2
− f (v)
}
. (2)
Limitations: The SH protocol described in [3] was presented in a
purely formalway,without addressing limitations that exist inpracti-
cal systems. For instance, the original SH protocol was formulated in
an “asymptotic” setting, inwhich a large number of reporting clients
is assumed. While the protocol works well in expectation, it presents
a number of practical drawbacks, which we discuss in Section 4.
3.4 Frequency Oracle Protocol
Wang et al. [28] recently proposed the Optimal Local Hashing (OLH)
protocol for estimating the frequency of items belonging to a given
domain. It satisfies ε-LDP and is simpler and logically equivalent
to the frequency oracle proposed in [3]. Instead of transmitting a
single bit, that is the result of mapping an item i to a binary value
{c√m,−c√m}, then users who participate in the system simply hash
their items into a value in [д], whereд≥2. The pseudo-code of the
OLH randomizer is reported in Algorithm 5 (in Appendix A). For
further details, we refer the reader to [28] and to its publicly avail-
able implementation [27]. It is worth noting that OLH is limited to
frequency estimation, and that it is not suitable by itself for heavy
hitter detection in large domains, as for the case inwhich the domain
includes all possible valid phone numbers.
4 SYSTEMDETAILS
Asmentioned earlier,we envision a collaborative blacklisting system
consisting of n distinct smartphones and a centralized serverC , as
shown in Figure 1.C is responsible for receiving data from the partic-
ipating phones and for computing a blacklist of phone numbers (i.e.,
caller IDs) likely associated with phone spamming activities. Once
computed, the blacklist can be propagated back to the participating
phones to enable flagging future unwanted calls as likely spam.
Each participating smartphone runs an application that collects
information about phone calls received from unknown phone num-
bers, where unknown heremeans that the caller’s phone numberwas
not registered into the smartphone’s contact list. More precisely, let
pi be a participating smartphone and c j be a caller ID. If pi receives
a call from c j and c j is not in pi ’s contact list, then c j is labeled as
unknown and reported toC by pi . Notice that, in this scenario, only
the caller ID c j is reported, and no information about the content of
the call is shared withC .
To preserve the privacy of phone calls received by participating
users (i.e., the owners of the phones that contribute data toC), the
caller ID data collection app running on each smartphone imple-
ments a local differentially private (LDP) algorithm, whose details
are described below in this section.
4.1 Overview of LDP Protocol
Following the intuitions and motivations for our approach provided
in Section 2, we cast the problem of learning a phone blacklist as a
heavy hitter detection problem. To this end, we build our solution
upon the SH protocol for heavy hitter detection proposed in [3] and
summarized in Section 3. Unfortunately, the original SH protocol is
not directly suitable for our application, because it was formulated
in a theoretical “asymptotic” setting in which a large number of
reporting clients is assumed [3].
First, we implemented a practical client-server formulation of the
SH protocol proposed in [3]. After performing pilot experiments,
we found that applying the protocol as is in a setting with a limited
number of clients (e.g., in the tens of thousand) and in which we aim
to correctly reconstruct heavy hitters with a relatively low volume
(e.g., only a few hundreds of hits) was not possiblewithout setting an
extremely high privacy budget, thus completely jeopardizing users’
privacy.
To make SH usable in practice and adapt it to our phone blacklist-
ing problem, we therefore designed and implemented a number of
modifications that address the following two fundamental problems:
• Sparsity of user reports: In the SHprotocol, the larger the items
domainV , the more frequent an itemmust be to be correctly
reconstructed by the serverC with high probability. Namely,
an itemmust be reported by a larger and larger population,
as the cardinality ofV increases, thus potentially impeding
the reconstruction of spam phone numbers involved in cam-
paigns that reach only a portion of the contributing users.
• High variance in the sum of item reports hinders noise cancella-
tion: The sum z in Algorithm 7 (line 6) is affected by the high
variance of the distribution of the sum of each bit. Ideally,
the noisy random bits sent by users who do not hold value
v (i.e.,that transmit a randomized version of x = 0 in Algo-
rithm 6, lines 7-8) should cancel out during summation.While
this holds in expectation, in practice (with a finite number
of participants) it is highly unlikely to have the very same
number of clients who transmit 1√
m
as clients who transmit
− 1√
m
, potentially causing the reconstruction of the wrong bit
value at the server side.
We address the first issue by introducing a data bucketization
mechanism. Specifically, we take advantage of characteristics of
the phone blacklisting problem to (1) reduce the dimensionality of
the items domain, and (2) partition the problem domain to increase
the relative frequency of heavy hitters. To achieve (1), we divide
phone numbers into area code prefix (e.g., the first three digits in a
US telephone number) and phone number suffix (e.g., the remaining
seven digits, for a US phone number).
In telephony, area codes are typically not considered to be sensi-
tive. For instance, the FTC dataset protects the privacy of complain-
ing users by publishing only their area code [14] (see also Sections 2
and 5.1). As outlined in Section 2, we aim to protect the privacy of
the phone number suffix. Hence, given the large number of phone
numbers that share the same prefix, clients can transmit the area
code as is, and apply the (modified) SH protocol only to the phone
number suffix, thus reducing the number of bits needed to represent
5
Algorithm 2:Modified SH-Client(v ,H ,T ,K , εHH, εOLH)
Input: the value to be sentv , a fixed list of hash
functionsH, # of repetitionsT , # of channelsK , privacy parameters εHH and εOLH
/* sending noisy reports for heavy hitter detection */
1 ρ←pref ix (v)
2 σ←v \ρ
3 for t =1 toT do
4 H←H[t ]
5 foreach channel k ∈ [K ] do
6 if H (σ )=k then
7 x=Enc(σ )
8 else
9 x=0
10 z(t,k,ρ )←Rext
(
x,
εHH
2T
)
11 Send z(t,k,ρ ) to the server on channel k
/* sending noisy report for heavy hitter frequency estimation */
12 w (ρ )←ROLH(v,εOLH)
13 Sendw (ρ ) to the server
each phone number. To achieve (2), we assign a separate communi-
cation channel between clients and server to each area code, and run
an instance of the (modified) SH protocol independently for each
area code. This has the effect of clustering phone numbers based
on their prefix. Because in some cases phone spam campaigns are
conducted using specific area codes (e.g., aWashingtonDCarea code
for IRS spamcampaigns, or an 800 prefix for tech support scams, etc.),
this bucketization of phone numbers has the effect of amplifying the
relative frequency of spam-related caller IDs in some of the area code
buckets (or clusters), thus making it easier to detect heavy hitters.
Figure 2 shows a example of how in practice bucketization helps to
amplify the relative frequency of heavy hitters.
In summary, we (i) group phone numbers by area code, (ii) split
area code and phone suffix, (iii) select the client-server communica-
tion channel based on the area code, and (iv) let each client transmit
the area code in clear (i.e., no LDP) and run the SH protocol over
phone number suffixes within transmitted area codes.
To address the high variance in the sum of item reports, we intro-
duce a new extended randomizer to replace the original randomizer
proposed in [3] and reported in Algorithm 1. The main idea is to use
a three-value randomizer. For instance, when x=0must be sent, in-
stead of choosing a randombit value between { 1√
m
,− 1√
m
}, the client
app will choose between three values: { 1√
m
,0,− 1√
m
}, with different
probabilities. Our externded randomizer is defined in Algorithm 4.
In Appendix D we formally show how this extended randomizer
helps reducing the variance, thus increasing the accuracywithwhich
privately-reported phone numbers are reconstructed on the server
side.
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Figure 2: Phonenumber frequencybefore (left) andafter (right) bucketization,
computed on one day of complaints from the FTC dataset.
Algorithm 3:Modified SH-Server(T ,K , P,OLH)
Input: # of repetitionT , # of channelsK , set of prefixesP, a frequency oracleOLH, thresholdη
Output: list of heavy hitters Γ
/* detecting heavy hitters */
1 Γ←∅
2 for t =1 toT do
3 foreach prefix ρ ∈ [P] do
4 foreach channel k ∈ [K ] do
5 foreach user j ∈ [nρ ] do
6 zj ←z(t,k,ρ )
value received from user j on channel k , having prefix ρ ;
7 z= 1nρ
∑nρ
j=1zj
8 for i =1 tom do
9 y[i]←
{ 1√
m
if z[i] ≥ 0
− 1√
m
otherwise.
10 σˆ←Dec(y)
11 vˆ← append σ to ρ
12 if vˆ <Γ then add vˆ to Γ
/* filtering out false positives */
13 foreach prefix ρ ∈ [P] do
14 foreach user j ∈ [nρ ] do
15 w[j]←w (ρ ) value received from user j having prefix ρ
16 foreach vˆ ∈ Γ do
17 fˆ (vˆ)← estimate the frequency of vˆ usingOLH(w)
18 if fˆ (vˆ)<η then remove vˆ from Γ
19 return {(v, fˆ (v)) : v ∈ Γ }
Notice also that while in the following we present our LDP pro-
tocol under the assumption that each user has a single item to share
with the server (e.g., one unknown phone number report per day), in
real scenarios some users may either have multiple items to share or
nothing to share at all (e.g., no phone calls received in a given day).
In this case, the protocol can be easily extended as proposed in [24],
by sampling a single telephone number from the set of unknown
calls that the app has collected. Conversely, if a user has nothing to
share, the app can generate a dummy (but legitimate) phone number
to be sent to the server.
It is also important tonotice thatorganizingphonenumber reports
in buckets allows the server to count the number of users that will
participate to a protocol run, per each bucket. In Appendix C, we dis-
cuss how the server can use this number to estimate the probability
that at least one heavy hitter in a specific bucket will be successfully
reconstructed. If such probability is low, the server can avoid exe-
cuting the protocol for those buckets and inform the clients of this
decision, thus preventing those clients fromwasting their privacy
budget. In practice, once the server receives the area codes from each
client, it could send a message back to the clients letting them know
if they should send (using the LDPprotocol) the remaining portion of
the caller IDs they observed (i.e., the remaining seven digits) or not.
Algorithm 4: Rext(x,ε): ε-extended Randomizer
Input:m-bit string x, privacy budget ε
1 Sample r←[m] uniformly at random.
2 if x,0 then
3 zr =

c ·m ·xr w.p. p
−c ·m ·xr w.p. q
0 w.p. 1−p−q
, where c > 0.
4 else
5 zr =

c
√
m w.p. θ
−c√m w.p. θ
0 w.p. 1−2θ
6 return z= (0, ...,0,zr ,0, ...,0)
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The new LDP protocol resulting from our improvements over
the original SH protocol is shown in Algorithms 2 and 3, where
new pseudo-code is highlighted in black, and code that remains the
same as in the original SH protocol is shaded in gray. Unlike the
original version, we explicitly allocate two different privacy budgets,
εHH and εOLH, assigned respectively to heavy hitter detection and
frequency estimation. It is worth mentioning that εHH is the total
privacy budget spent by each user to send noisy reports to the server
during the T protocol rounds (lines 3 − 11). In this new formula-
tion ε = (εHH+εOLH) and the protocol is (εHH+εOLH)-differentially
private, as proved in Appendix D.
5 LDP PROTOCOL EVALUATION
In this section, we present an evaluation of our LDP protocol. It is
important to notice that we focus primarily on estimating the accu-
racy of our systemwith respect to reconstructing and detecting heavy
hitters. We will discuss the utility of the phone blacklist that may be
learned from the detected heavy hitters separately, in Section 6.
5.1 Dataset
Ideally, to evaluate our protocol wewould need to collect a dataset of
phone call records from thousands of users. Even though we assume
only calls from unknown numbers (i.e., numbers not stored in the
users’ respective contact lists) would be of interest for detecting po-
tential spamphonenumbers, collectingsuchadataset isverydifficult,
due exactly to the same privacy issue we aim to solve in this paper.
As a proxy for that dataset, wemake use of real-world phone data ex-
tracted from user complaints to the FTC. In essence, the FTC allows
users in the US to report unwanted phone calls. Reported complaints
that are made available to the public typically include the time of the
complaint, the full caller ID, theuser’s phonenumber area code, and a
label indicating the type of phone spam activity. Notice that the FTC
aim to protect the privacy of the users who report a complaint; that’s
why they only publish users’ phone number prefixes. On the other
hand, the caller IDs are reported in clear because the complaining
users explicitly label them as unwanted caller, essentially consenting
to their public release.On theotherhand, our systemdoesnot require
users to explicitly label unwanted phone calls; all unknown caller IDs
are reported, andprivacy ispreservedviaLDPmechanisms (please re-
fer to Section 1, where wemotivate the advantages of this approach).
In this paper, we treat each complaint as if a user participating
in our collaborative blacklist learning system had received a phone
call from the complained-about number at the time recorded in the
complaint. We were able to obtain a large set of user complaints
collected by the FTC between Feb. 17th 2016 and Mar. 17th, 2016,
for a total of 29 days, which consists of 471,460 complaints. For the
sake of this evaluation, we consider only valid 10-digit caller IDs,
which constitute about 95% of the entire dataset. The distribution
of complaints is characterized by two properties: (a) the volume of
complaints follows a weekly pattern, with fewer complaints submit-
ted on weekends; and (2) the distribution of complaints per caller
ID has a long tail, whereby most phone numbers receive only one
complaint but there also exist many phone numbers that receive
hundreds of complaints (see Figures 9 and 10 in appendix for details).
As the FTC dataset does not contain an identifier for the reporting
users, without loss of generality we assume that, within a day, each
complaint is reported by a different user. Based on this, we determine
the pool of users that would participate in our collaborative black-
listing as follows: we compute themaximum number of reports seen
in one day, throughout the entire month of FTC data, which is equal
to 23,188; we then set the number of participants to that number. In
days in which fewer than 23,188 users sent complaints to the FTC,
we assume that the remaining users did not have any calls to report
(i.e., they did not receive any calls from unknown numbers on those
days). However, to preserve differential privacy guarantees, all users
must send a report every time the protocol runs (e.g., daily, in our
evaluation). Therefore, if a user has no calls to report, the app on her
smartphone will generate a random (but valid) 10-digit number, and
report that number to the server using the LDP protocol, exactly as
if she received a call from that number.
5.2 LDP Protocol Configuration
In all our experiments we use area code bucketization, with the same
parameter settings for all buckets. We also compare results obtained
using the basic randomizer proposed in [3] to results obtained using
our extended randomizer (Algorithm 4), using the same parameter
settings for each, to allow for an “apples to apples” comparison.
We set two different privacy budgets to run the heavy hitter detec-
tion and the frequency estimation protocol. Respectively, we experi-
mentwith budget εHH ∈ {12,8.8,7,5.6,4.4} for heavyhitter detection,
and εOLH=3 for frequency estimation. We chose the values εHH for
both the basic and extended randomizer so that the randomizer sends
the correct phone number with probability approximately equal to
0.95, 0.90, 0.85, 0.80 and 0.75. Moreover, we do not allocate a εHH
value lower than4.4given that, as later discussed inSection7, theutil-
ity of the learned blacklist is already 0 when εHH=4.4 (see Figure 7).
It is important to also notice that guaranteeing differential privacy
under continual observation [8] in the more difficult LDP setting is
still an open problem in differential privacy research. A complete
solution to such a challenging openproblem is therefore left to future
work. Nonetheless, one possible mitigation may be to design the
data collection app so that a user does not report the same number
more than once (see Section 7 for further discussion).
To implement the binary encoding of phone numbers (see Algo-
rithm 2 line 7), we use a ReedMuller error-correcting code, RM(3,5);
this is a [32,26,4]2 code with relative distance equal to 1/8 and error
correcting capability equal to 1 bit [17]. Notice thatk=26 bits is suffi-
cient to encode 7-digit phonenumbers,which requires aminimumof
24 bits. At server-side, we run the heavy hitter detection phase only
for those buckets containing more than a minimum number, τ , of
complaints, as motivated in Sections 4.1 and C. We experiment with
5 different values of τ in the set {143,151,161,174,195}. These values
correspond, respectively, to a 75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95% probability of
correctly reconstructing, at least, a phone number per bucket (see
also Equation 4).
5.3 Measuring HeavyHitter Detections
We now define howwemeasure accuracy for the LDP protocol. No-
tice that in this section we consider accuracy strictly for the heavy
hitter detection task accomplished by the LDP protocol. This is re-
lated to but different from the utility of the blacklist that can be
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Figure 4: True, false and undetected heavy hitters (respectively, THHs, FHHs and UHHs). Parameters:T =2, εHH=8.8, εOLH=3.
learned over the phone numbers reconstructed by the server-side
LDP protocol (see Section 6 for results on blacklist utility).
Letv be a phone number, and c(v) be the number of users who
reported a call fromv . We say that c(v) is the ground truth frequency
ofv . Moreover, let fˆ (v) be the number of reports aboutv estimated
by the server after running the LDP protocol, and η be the detection
threshold for heavy hitter detection defined in Equation 3 (see also
Algorithms 7 and 3). Also, as discussed in Section 5.2, let τ be the
minimum number of complaints necessary for the server to decide
whether to run the heavy hitter detection phase for a bucket.
In theory, we could simply useη as heavy hitter frequency thresh-
old, to measure true and false detections. However, given Equation 3
and substituting practical values of ε and β , η tends to be much
smaller than τ . For instance, considering ε=15, β =0.751,T =2, and
d=107, and assuming n=1000 users reporting caller IDs to a given
area code bucket, we obtain η≊0.023. Thus, the heavy hitter detec-
tion threshold (in terms of number of reports per caller ID) would
be η ·n=23. In other words, a phone number would be considered a
heavy hitter if it is reported more than 22 times. Yet, as we discussed
in Section C, the minimum number of reports needed for the server
to correctly reconstruct a phone number with high probability is
much higher than 23 (e.g., at least 84 reports are needed to have a 50%
chance of correct reconstruction). We therefore use τ as the heavy
hitter detection threshold, rather than relying on η. Specifically, we
define the following quantities.
• True Heavy Hitters (THHs). We have a true heavy hitter
detection forv if both c(v)>τ and fˆ (v)>τ .
• False Heavy Hitters (FHHs). We have a false heavy hitter
detection forv if c(v)≤τ whereas fˆ (v)>τ .
• UndetectedHeavyHitters (UHHs).Wehave anundetected
heavy hitter if c(v)>τ whereas fˆ (v)≤τ .
It is worth noting that FHHs are typically due to a phone number
v whose true frequency c(v) is just below τ , and for which the noise
introduced by the LDP protocol causes the server to (by chance)
estimate its frequency above the heavy hitter detection threshold.
On the other hand, UHHs represent heavy hitters that the protocol
fails to detect, due to the random noise added by the clients. Given
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Figure 5: F1-score with parametersT =2, εOLH=3, and τ = 143.
the above definitions, and their analogy with true and false positives
in detection systems, we measure the F1-score of the heavy hitter
detection protocol as:
• Recall: R=THHs/(THHs+UHHs)
• Precision: P =THHs/(THHs+FHHs)
• F1-score: F1=2∗(P ∗R)/(P+R)
5.4 LDPHeavyHitter Detection Accuracy
Figure 3 shows the number of THH detected for different privacy
budgets εHH, when T = 2, and εOLH = 3 (error bars represent one
standard deviation). The figure compares the accuracy that can be
obtained by using the basic randomizer (as in [3]) and our extended
randomizer (Algorithm 4). Themaximumprivacy budget spent daily
by each client running the LDP protocol can be computed by sum-
ming privacy budgets εHH and εOLH (e.g., ε=15, when εHH=12 and
εOLH=3). It is worth noting that an user may have no phone number
to report: in that case, the privacy budget spent by the client would
be 0. Each experimental evaluation with a given εHH and εOLH was
repeated 10 times, and the results averaged.
Figure 3 also reports the number of FHHs and UHHs obtained for
different values of the privacy budget. As can be seen, the LDP proto-
col detects less than 8 FHHs, on average. Asmentioned in Section 5.3,
such false heavy hitters are phone numbers whose frequency is just
below τ and whose LDP-estimated frequency happens to slightly
exceed the heavy hitter detection threshold due to the randomiza-
tion of user contributions. In addition, the higher the εHH allocated
8
143 151 161 174 195
τ
60
70
80
90
100
F1
-s
co
re
(%
)
Extended
Basic
Figure 6: F1-score with parameters:T =2, εHH=8.8, εOLH=3, and τ =143.
for detecting heavy hitters, the higher the probability of correctly
reconstructing phone numbers whose frequency is just below τ
and, hence, generating FHHs. Figure 4 shows how THHs, FHHs,
and UHHs vary with τ , using the same parameters of the previous
experimental evaluations, but fixing εHH to 8.8. As can be observed,
increasing τ decreases the total number of detectable heavy hitters
(i.e., the sumof THHs andUHHs), as expected, since fewer and fewer
reported caller IDs will have a true frequency c(v)>τ .
It is also important to notice that, as shown in Figure 5, overall our
LDP protocol with the extended randomizer performs better than
using the basic randomizer proposed in [3], when εHH ∈ {12,8.8,7},
which yield an F1-score above 85%. The scores have been computed
by using THHs, FHHs, and UHHs depicted in Figure 3, averaged
across 10 runs. For lower values of εHH, the F1-score decreases sig-
nificantly, and the extended randomizer tends to perform slightly
worse than the basic randomizer. This is because the probability of
injecting noise in the reports (at the clients side) increases consider-
ably. This aspect, in combinationwith the fact that, by definition, the
extended randomizer has a lower probability of sending the correct
report to the server, compared the basic randomizer, determines a
slight reduction in performance for low values of εHH.
Finally, Figure 6 reports the F1-score as τ changes. Higher values
of τ allow us to obtain higher scores, because the number of UHHs
decreases (see Figure 4). The basic and extended randomizers follow
similar trends, though the extended randomizer performs better
than the basic one, independently from the choice of τ .
6 BLACKLIST UTILITY
In Section 5 we evaluated the ability of our LDP protocol to accu-
rately detect heavy hitter caller IDs. We now look at how a blacklist
learned over heavy hitters detected using our protocol would fare
compared to when no privacy is preserved, whereby caller IDs are
collected from users’ phones and sent directly to the server (no noise
added). To compare these scenarios, we leverage the call blocking
rate (CBR) metric proposed in [23].
In away similar to [23], we define a blacklistB as a set of caller IDs
that have been reported by users more than θ times. Specifically, as
in [23], we use a sliding windowmechanism, whereby a blacklistB
is updated daily by cumulatively adding daily heavy hitter caller IDs
observed over the past time window (one week, in our experiments).
Blacklisted caller IDs older than the sliding window are forgotten,
and removed fromB. As an example, making use again of the FTC
dataset (see Section 5.1), the blacklist that each user deploys on Feb-
ruary 24th contains all the heavyhitters detected eachdayduring the
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Figure 7: CBR: percentage of calls blocked compared to the baseline.
week going fromFeb. 17th to Feb. 23rd. TheCBR is then computed by
measuringhowmanycalls areflaggedbyBon thedayof deployment.
To enable a comparison between the private and non-private
versions of blacklist learning, we set the same fixed heavy hitter
detection threshold θ for both. In other words, in the case when no
privacy is offered, caller IDs that are reported by more than θ users
in a day are considered as potential spammers. Similarly, when our
LDP protocol is used to learn the blacklist, we fix the heavy hitter
detection threshold τ = θ . The other protocol parameters in this
experiment are set toT =2 and εOLH=3, while varying εHH.
As a baseline, we compute (over the FTC dataset) the median call
blocking rate CBR∗ that can be achieved throughout a month of FTC
reports, without applying any privacy-preserving mechanism and
for different values of θ (we compute the median because it is less
sensitive to outliers, compared to the average). Then, we compare
CBR∗ to the CBR obtained by the blacklist learned using our LDP
protocol, by computing the median of the fraction of calls that our
blacklist would block, compared to CBR∗. The results are reported in
Figure 7. As can be seen, as the overall privacy budget ε increases, the
CBR approaches the baseline CBR∗, which is indicated by the 100%
mark. It can be noticed that the differencewith the baseline increases
as θ reduces. This is because it is more unlikely that the server will
correctly reconstruct caller IDs that have a lower number of reports
(see Section C). Therefore, as θ decreases, heavy hitters with low
frequency (close to θ ) can still be detected in the scenario without
privacy, but become more difficult to detect for our LDP protocol.
In practice, whenever a user receives a call from an unknown
caller ID that is in the blacklist, the app will inform the user that the
number is suspicious, and potentially involved in spamming. The
user may ultimately decide to pick up the call, but use more caution
when interacting with the other party.
7 DISCUSSION
InSection5.4,wehave reported several results related to theaccuracy
of the proposed LDP protocol using different privacy budgets and
confidence parameters. Depending on howmuch budget the server
provides to system users, the SH protocol parameters can be tuned
to control privacy/utility trade-offs. As mentioned in Section 5.2,
Apple uses up to ε=16 [1] as privacy budget for gathering statistics.
For instance, the Safari browser allows for two user contributions
per day, with ε=8 each. On the other hand, in this paper we exper-
imented with a maximum privacy budget of ε = 15 with one user
contribution per day.While the privacy budget may seem somewhat
high compared to non-local differential privacy applications, it is
worth noting that this is due to the inherent complexity of LDP.
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For instance, it has been shown that ε-LDP distribution estimators
require k/ε2 times larger datasets than a comparable non-private
algorithm [6, 19],wherek is the size of the input alphabet (i.e.,k is the
number of possible phone number combinations, in our case). As k
can be very large, higher values of ε allowus to achieve an acceptable
utility even with relatively small values of the sample set size n (i.e.,
the number of noisy reports received by the server). Furthermore,
we also showed that even for lower values of epsilon (e.g., ε=11.8),
blacklist utility can still be reasonable (e.g., around 80% of the CBR∗
obtained in the scenario with no privacy, as shown in Section 6).
A privacy budget that can provide more privacy while keeping a
good performance trade-off is ε =10 (withT =2, εHH =7, εOLH =3,
and τ =143): our experimental evaluation shows an F1-score higher
than 75% with the detection of more than 97 potential spam phone
numbers per day, on average.
A limitation of our system, which is common to practical deploy-
ments of LDP such as in the case of Apple and other vendors, is that
guaranteeing differential privacy under continual observation [8]
in an LDP setting is still an open research problem in differential
privacy. As a possible mitigation, the data collection app running
on the user’s phone can keep history of the reported numbers and
avoid reporting the same calling number more than once within a
given timewindow (e.g., onemonth). Thiswouldmake itmuchmore
difficult for the server to identify a phone number that may have
called a specific user with high frequency (e.g, once a day), since
it will be reported only once by that user. At the same time, if the
same number is reported only once but by many users, it can still
be detected as heavy hitter and added to the blacklist.
It is also possible that a legitimate phone numbermay be reported
by many users, such as in the case of school alert numbers or other
types of emergency phone numbers thatmay contact a large number
of users at once, since these numbers may not be recorded in every
user’s contact list. Such phone numbers may potentially be detected
as heavy hitters, and thus considered by the server for blacklisting.
However, the server could check the validity of a number, before
propagating it to the blacklist. For instance, the server could use au-
tomated reverse phone number lookup services (e.g., whitepages.com)
to filter out possible false positives related to emergency numbers.
Our work is based on the heavy hitter LDP protocol proposed
in [3], which, to the best of our knowledge, was one of very few
state-of-the-art LDP protocols for heavy hitter detection at the time
when we started the research presented in this paper. Alongside [3],
RAPPOR [9, 10] is another protocol that could be adapted to fit our
problem. However, it has been shown that RAPPOR performs less
well than amore recent protocol namedTreeHist [2], and that in turn
TreeHist itself has ahigherworst-case error, compared to theoriginal
SH protocol proposed in [3]. Similarly, it has been shown in [28] that
for frequency estimation the OLH protocol (which we summarized
in Section 3.4 and used in our system) performs better than RAPPOR.
Recently, a few new LDP protocols for heavy hitter detection
have been also proposed [2, 24, 29]. However, [3] remains a state-of-
the-art protocol that has inspired more recent works. Furthermore,
in this paper we focus on studying how to make LDP heavy hitter
detection practical to address an important and previously unsolved
security problem: privacy-preserving collaborative phone blacklisting.
We believe that the application-specific trade-offs between privacy
and utility we presented in this paper would still be relevant even if
[3] was replaced by a different LDP heavy hitter detection protocol.
In Section 5, we performed experiments with a fixed value of pa-
rameterT =2. In the original formulation of the SH protocol [3],T is
directly related to the parameter β wementioned in Section 3.While
it would be possible in theory to use higher parameter values, in-
creasingT (by varying β)would result in ahigher number of protocol
rounds, and would thus consume a much larger privacy budget ε for
eachuser.Conversely, increasingT whilekeepingε fixedwouldcause
a significant degradation of heavy hitter detection accuracy, and in
turn of the blacklist utility. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, we did
not report experimental results obtained with larger values ofT .
8 RELATEDWORK
Besides RAPPOR [9, 10], which we briefly discussed in Section 7,
there exist other works related to LDP heavy hitter detection; we
brieflydiscuss thembelow.However, it shouldbenoted that ourwork
is different from the ones discussed here. Our main contributions
are in adapting a state-of-the-art protocol proposed in [3] to make it
practical, and in using the adapted protocol to build a collaborative
phone blacklisting systemwith provable privacy guarantees.
In [24], the SH protocol proposed in [3] is extended to handle set-
valued data, where each user holds a set of items v= {v1,...,vt } ⊆V .
One difficulty in the set-valued data setting is that the length of the
itemset each user has is different. To address this challenge, Qin et
al [24] proposed a protocol, called LDPMiner, for finding heavy hit-
ters from set-valued data. The main idea of LDPMiner is to pad each
user’s itemsetwithdummy items to ensure that it has thefixed length
ℓ. Each user randomly samples one item from v and reports the item
using theSHprotocol.Theestimated frequencyof items inLDPMiner
is multiplied by ℓ to account for the random sampling procedure.
Bassily et al. [2] andWang et al. [29] independently proposed a
similar protocol that iteratively identifies heavy hitters using a prefix
tree. In their protocol, users are randomly split intoд disjoint groups.
At iteration i , the server receives noisy reports from the users in
the ith group, . Each user in the ith group reports the randomized
version of the first li bits of the encoded item (i.e., a prefix of length
li ), where l1 < l2 ··· < lд . After aggregating the user reports from
the ith group, the server identifies frequent prefixesCi of length li
and builds the candidate heavy hitter items of length li+1 by con-
catenatingCi with strings in {0,1}li+1−li . Recently, Wang et al. [30]
provided a thorough analysis on the “pad-and-sampling-based fre-
quency oracle (PSFO)” and proposed an LDP solution to the frequent
itemset mining problem. Their protocol adaptively chooses between
two algorithms based on the size of the domain |V|.
9 CONCLUSION
We proposed a novel collaborative detection system that learns a
list of spam-related phone numbers from call records contributed
by participating users. Our system makes use of local differential
privacy to provide clear privacy guarantees. We evaluated the sys-
tem on real-world user-reported call records collected by the FTC,
and showed that it is possible to learn a phone blacklist in a privacy
preserving way using a reasonable overall privacy budget, while at
the same time maintaining the utility of the learned blacklist.
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A CLIENT-SERVER SHALGORITHMS
Algorithms 6 and 7 show the client-server formulation of the SH
protocol discussed in Section 3.3.
In order to run the client protocol, each client first needs to know
the number of communication channelsK that has to be established
with the server for sending private reports. Hence, before starting
the SH protocol, the server communicates the correct number of
channelsK to the clients. Notice that the server is the only one who
can computeK , sinceK depends on the number of users contributing
to the system at any given time. ForT times, in each channel k and
round t in [T ], the user sends to the server a randomized report z(t,k ),
which represents the (encoded) value ofv she holds or a special value
0 indicating that the user does not hold a value to be reported.
The choice of sending the randomized report associated with
Enc(v) (or with 0) depends on whether the channel identifier k
matches the value returned by the hash functionH applied onv .H
belongs to a pairwise independent hash function familyH , publicly
available and accessible to all the clients as part of the client-side
protocol configuration.
In each round of the protocol, a different hash function is em-
ployed to minimize the probability of collisions among different
heavy hitters. Notice that, except for a single channel in which the
client sends the private report obtained from Rbas for a valuev , in
all the other channels the client sends randomized reports for the
special value 0 (see Algorithm 6).
On the server side, the server receives in each channel k the pri-
vate reports z(t,k ) sent by users for each specific run t . In each round
and for each channel, the server aggregates the randomized reports
to reconstruct the codeword ywhose hash of the original valuev
corresponds to channel k . Hence, the decoded value vˆ , if correctly
reconstructed, should represent the private information sent by (a
non-negligible number of) users in thek-th channel in a specific run
of the SH protocol. The set of reconstructed values is stored in the
set of potential heavy hitters Γ. Due to noisy reports, some values
in Γ may not be heavy hitters.
To filter out possible false positives, similarly to the previous
phase the server collects noisy reportswj from users and aggregates
them in a single bitstringw. For each reconstructed value vˆ in Γ, its
frequency f (vˆ) is estimated using a frequency oracle (FO) function.
If the computed estimate fˆ (vˆ) is less than a threshold η, then vˆ is
Algorithm 5: ROLH(v,ε): ε-OLH Randomizer
Input: valuev , a hash functionH , OLH д parameter, privacy budget ε
1 x←H (v) % д
2 Sampley←[д]\ {x } uniformly at random.
3 w =
{
x w.p. e
ε
eε +д−1
y w.p. д−1eε +д−1
4 returnw
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Algorithm 6: SH-Client(v ,H ,T ,K , ε)
Input: them-bit string representation v of the valuev to be sent, a fixed list of
hash functionsH, # of repetitionsT , # of channelsK , privacy parameter ε
/* sending noisy reports for heavy hitter detection */
1 for t =1 toT do
2 H←H[t ]
3 foreach channel k ∈ [K ] do
4 if H (v)=k then
5 x=Enc(v)
6 else
7 x=0
8 z(t,k )←Rbas
(
x,
ε
2T +1
)
9 Send z(t,k ) to the server on channel k
/* sending noisy report for heavy hitter frequency estimation */
10 w←Rbas
(
v,
ε
2T +1
)
11 Sendw to the server
removed from Γ. After this filtering phase, the server can then return
the set of detected heavy hitters.
The threshold η plays a crucial role in the heavy hitter detection:
η=
2T +1
ε
√
log(d)log(1/β)
n
(3)
where β [3] is a parameter related to the confidence the server has
on the heavy hitters it has detected. The same parameter β also influ-
ences the number of protocol rounds,T [3]. The server-side protocol
pseudo-code is represented in Algorithm 7, whereas Algorithm 5
refers to the discussion in Section 3.4.
B ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC RANDOMIZER
We first show that the frequency estimate fˆ (v) obtained using the
basic randomizer is unbiased:
E[fˆ (v)]=E[ 1
n
n∑
j=1
w⊺j xv
]
=
1
n
{ ∑
j :vj =v
E[w⊺j xv ]+
∑
j :vj ,v
E[w⊺j xv ]
}
=
1
n
∑
j :vj =v
x⊺j xv
=
1
n
∑
j :vj =v
∥xj ∥2=
∑
j :vj =v 1
n
= f (v),
where xv =c(v) denotes the encoding of itemv .
We next calculate the variance of the estimate given by the basic
randomizer. Let r= (r1,...,r j ,...,rn ) be a vector of random bits chosen
by user j, where r j ∈ [m]. By the law of total variance, for an item
v ∈V , the variance of estimate fˆ (v) is
Var(fˆ (v))=E[Var(fˆ (v) | r)]+Var(E[fˆ (v) | r])
=
1
n
{(c2−1)f (v)+(1−f (v))c2 }
=
c2−f (v)
n
,
where we have
Var(fˆ (v) | r)
=Var
( 1
n
n∑
j=1
w [r j ] ·xv [r j ] | r
)
=
1
n2
Var
( n∑
j=1
w [r j ] | r j
)
xv [r j ]2
Algorithm 7: SH-Server(T ,K , FO)
Input: # of repetitionT , # of channelsK , a frequency oracle FO, a threshold η
Output: list of heavy hitters Γ
/* detecting heavy hitters */
1 Γ←∅
2 for t =1 toT do
3 foreach channel k ∈ [K ] do
4 foreach user j ∈ [n] do
5 zj←z(t,k ) value received from user j on channel k ;
6 z= 1n
∑n
j=1zj
7 for i =1 tom do
8 y[i]←
{ 1√
m
if z[i] ≥ 0
− 1√
m
otherwise.
9 vˆ←Dec(y)
10 if vˆ <Γ then add vˆ to Γ
/* filtering out false positives */
11 foreach user j ∈ [n] do
12 wj←w value received from user j
13 w= 1n
∑n
j=1wj
14 foreach vˆ ∈ Γ do
15 fˆ (vˆ)← estimate the frequency of vˆ using FO(w)
16 if fˆ (vˆ)<η then remove vˆ from Γ
17 return {(v, fˆ (v)) : v ∈ Γ }
=
xv [r j ]2
n2
{ ∑
j :vj =v
Var(w [r j ] | r j )+
∑
j :vj ,v
Var(w [r j ] | r j )
}
=
xv [r j ]2
n2
{
nf (v)(c2m2x [r j ]2−m2x [r j ]2)
+n(1−f (v))(c2m−02)
}
and
E[fˆ (v) | r]=E
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
w [r j ] ·xv [r j ] | r
]
=
1
n
{ ∑
j :vj =v
E
[
w [r j ] ·xv [r j ] | r j
]
+
∑
j :vj ,v
0
}
=
1
n
∑
j :vj =v
m ·x [r j ]2 .
C ANALYSIS
OF AREACODE BUCKETIZATION
Let us first analyze how the probability that the serverC correctly re-
constructs a reportedphonenumberdependson the size of thephone
numbers space and the number of reports. In this simplified analysis,
we will assume no noise is added to the data transmitted from the
clients to the server. In other words, we will follow the fundamental
steps of the SH protocol in Algorithm 6, but pretend that the random-
izer (line 8) always returns the true valueof one randomly selected bit.
Let us now consider a domain V , in which each value can be
represented using l bits (i.e., |V|=2l ). Also, let us consider a value
v ∈V transmitted byn clients. For the sake of this simplified analysis,
on the server side we can viewv as a sequence of l different bins that
are initially empty, and the bits sent by the clients as balls. According
to the SH protocol for heavy hitter detection, each client transmits
only one bit, and therefore the server receives n balls. To correctly
reconstruct the value v , at least one ball must fill each bin. As re-
ported in [5], thenumber of non-emptybins resulting fromrandomly
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insertingn balls into l bins has the following probability distribution:
Ul,n (b)=
{n
b
} ( l
b
)
b!
ln
, ∀b ∈ {1,...,l} (4)
where
{n
b
}
is a Stirling number of the second kind, which expresses
the number of ways to partition a set ofn elements intob non-empty
subsets.Thenumerator in theequationexpresses thenumberofways
inwhichn balls fall exactly inb bins out of l available ones. Therefore,
forb=l ,Ul,n =
{nl }l !
ln givesus theprobability that all binswill befilled.
Intuitively, the larger l , the larger n must be to fill the bins. For
instance, in this simplified analysis, the 34-bit representation of a 10-
digit phone numberpwould need to be reported by at least 170 users,
for it to have about an 80% probability of being reconstructed at the
server side. In reality, the additional noise and the error-correction
encoding in the SH protocols further complicate the relationship
between l and n. However, it is clear that reducing l also reduces the
number of reports above which heavy hitters can be detected with
high probability. This motivates our choice of bucketizing phone
numbers by grouping them based on area codes, and by running a
separate instance of the SH protocol per bucket, as only seven digits
need to be reported by the SH protocol for each phone number in
a bucket. Following the above analysis, 111 reports are sufficient
to reconstruct 24-bit values (needed to represent 7-digit numbers)
with 80% probability, which equates to about a 34.7% reduction in
the number of reports to be received by the server.
Asoutlined inSection4.1, Equation4canalsobeusedby the server
for deciding if the clients that have a report to be sent within a given
bucket (i.e., if they need to report a caller ID within a given prefix)
should actually send the report (using LDP) or not. Considering 24
bits per phone number, as above, and assuming all clients in the same
bucket intend to report the same 7-digit phone number, all buckets
receiving less than 84 reports can be easily ignored, because the
serverwill have less than 50% probability of correctly reconstructing
a heavy hitter in those buckets. This probability is even lower in
practice, since each bucket will likely receive reports about different
phone numbers. Instructing clients that intend to send a report to
“low density” buckets to stop doing so will prevent running the LDP
protocol in vain. Thus, those clients can avoid wasting their privacy
budget for those specific LDP protocol runs.
Another benefit of grouping phone numbers by area code is that
some spam campaigns tend to use numbers with specific area codes.
Figure 8 visually shows this tendency.
Figure 2 shows a more comprehensive view of how the relative
frequency of phone numbers in the FTC data is amplified when
bucketization is used. Specifically, each vertical line represents the
frequency of caller IDs appearing in the FTC complaints dataset.
The figure on the left shows the occurrence frequency of phone
numbers relative to all complaints received in one day, whereas the
figure on the right shows how their relative frequency changes after
bucketization (notice the different y-axis scales for the two graphs).
The take away from this analysis is that bucketization results in the
amplification of the relative frequency of some heavy hitter caller
IDs and, hence, in the variance reduction of frequency estimates (see
Equation 2), thus increasing the likelihood that heavy hitters will
be correctly reconstructed and detected by the server.
D ANALYSIS OF EXTENDEDRANDOMIZER
While the frequency estimate fˆ (v) of an itemv ∈V computed from
noisy reports generated using the basic randomizer (in line 10 of Al-
gorithm6) is unbiased, its variance is oftenquite large inpractice, and
this could lead to low accuracy in heavy-hitter detection. Inspired by
the antithetic variates technique in Monte Carlo methods [20], we
extend the basic randomizer and introduce a new randomizer Rext
which yields lower variance. The extended randomizer is described
in Algorithm 4.
The main difference between the randomizers is in the number of
different values eachuser can report.Notice thatzr ∈ {c√m,0,−c√m}
in the extended randomizer, while zr ∈ {c√m,−c√m} in the basic
randomizer. The idea behind this modification is that the sum of
contributions from users who don’t have itemv to the estimate fˆ (v)
is non-zero in practice, due to the variance, while in expectation they
should cancel out.
The following lemma shows that the extended randomizer pro-
vides an unbiased estimate of (encoded) item x.
Lemma 1. Let p= eϵeϵ+2 , q=θ =
1
eϵ+2 , and c =
eϵ+2
eϵ−1 . The extended
randomizer Rext has the following properties:
(i) For every x∈ {−1/√m,1/√m}∪{0}, E[Rext(x)]=x.
(ii) Rext satisfies ϵ-LDP for every r ∈ [m].
The proof of the above lemma is provided in Appendix D.1.
Givenasetofnoisy reportsz1,...,zn generatedby theextendedran-
domizer, the randomizer yields an unbiased estimate of frequency
with smaller variance than the basic randomizer. The following
lemma formalizes this discussion, whose proof appears in Appen-
dix D.1.
Lemma 2. Letv∗ ∈V be an item and {wi }ni=1 be the noisy reports.
The frequency estimate fˆ (v∗) = 1n
∑n
j=1w
⊺
j c(v∗) has the following
properties:
(i) E[ fˆ (v∗)]= f (v∗) and
(ii) Var( fˆ (v∗))= 1n
{
f (v∗)·(c2(p+q)−1)+(1− f (v∗))·2c2θ},
where f (v∗) is the true frequency ofv∗.
Two important remarks are in order. First, the extended random-
izer Rext reduces to the basic randomizer Rbas if we set c = e
ε+1
eε−1 ,
p = e
ε
eε+1 , q =
1
eε+1 , and θ =
1
2 . Second, the above shows that the
variance of frequency estimate of an itemv∗ ∈V can be written as a
linear combination of two terms: c2(p+q) and 2c2θ . While we wish
to find optimal parameter values for c,p,q, and θ that minimize the
variance, this is not possible because f (v∗) is unknown. Instead, we
minimize themaximum of those two terms under ε-LDP constraints:
minimize
c,p,q,θ
max{c2(p+q),2c2θ }
subject to c(p−q)=1
p−eϵ θ ≤ 0, −p+e−ϵ θ ≤ 0
q−eϵ θ ≤ 0, −q+e−ϵ θ ≤ 0
p−eϵq ≤ 0, −p−e−ϵq ≤ 0
1−p−q−eϵ (1−2θ ) ≤ 0
−1+p+q+e−ϵ (1−2θ ) ≤ 0
0 ≤p+q ≤ 1, 0 ≤θ ≤ 12 .
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Solving the above optimization problem gives the following solu-
tion:
p=
eε
eε +2 , q=θ =
1
eε +2 , c =
eε +2
eε −1 . (5)
Proposition 1. The frequency estimate fˆ (v) of an itemv given by
Rext has lower variance than that given by Rbas if
ε ≥ lna+
√
9a2−20a+12
1−a ,
where a= f (v), i.e., the true frequency ofv .
The proof of the above proposition is simple and given in Appen-
dix D.1.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 3 satisfies (εHH+εOLH)-differential privacy.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from [3, Theorem 3.4] and is
included in the Appendix D.1 for completeness.
D.1 Proofs for Extended Randomizer
Lemma 1. Let p= eϵeϵ+2 , q=θ =
1
eϵ+2 , and c =
eϵ+2
eϵ−1 . The extended
randomizer Rext has the following properties:
(i) For every x∈ {−1/√m,1/√m}∪{0}, E[Rext(x)]=x.
(ii) Rext satisfies ϵ-LDP for every r ∈ [m].
Proof. Consider an itemv∗ ∈V on a channel k ∈ [K] and a hash
functionH :V→[K]. For users j withH (vj )=k , we have
E[Rext(xj )]=E[zj ]=E
[
E[zj | r j ]
]
=
1
m
(E[zj [1]], ...,E[zj [m]])⊺
=
1
m
(
cm(p−q)xj [1], ...,cm(p−q)xj [m]
)⊺
=c(p−q+)xj .
Since c(p−q) = 1, we have E[Rext(xj )] = xj . For those users with
H (vj ),k , their encoded item xj =Enc(vj )=0, and we have
E[zj ]= 1m (c
√
mθ−c√mθ, ...,c√mθ−c√mθ )=0=xj .
This completes the proof of the unbiasedness of Rext.
Next, we prove ϵ-LDP of the extended randomizer. Let v1 and
v2 be two arbitrary items inV and x1 and x2 be their encodings in
{−1/√m,1/√m}m∪{0}, respectively. For any zr ∈ {cmxr ,0,−cmxr },
we have
Pr[zr | x1,r ]
Pr[zr | x2,r ] ≤max
{
p
θ
,
1−2θ
1−p−q
}
=eϵ .
Similarly,
Pr[zr | x1,r ]
Pr[zr | x2,r ] ≥min
{
1−p−q
θ
,
θ
p
}
=e−ϵ .
□
Lemma 2. Letv∗ ∈V be an item and {wi }ni=1 be the noisy reports.
The frequency estimate fˆ (v∗) = 1n
∑n
j=1w
⊺
j c(v∗) has the following
properties:
(i) E[ fˆ (v∗)]= f (v∗) and
(ii) Var( fˆ (v∗))= 1n
{
f (v∗)·(c2(p+q)−1)+(1− f (v∗))·2c2θ},
where f (v∗) is the true frequency ofv∗.
Proof. Let x∗=c(v∗). We first prove the unbiasedness property.
Sincewj is an unbiased estimate of xj (i.e., E[wj ]=xj ), it is easy to
see that fˆ (v∗) is also unbiased.
E[fˆ (v∗)]=E
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
w⊺j c(v∗)
]
=
1
n
{ ∑
j :vj =v∗
E[w⊺j xj ]+
∑
j :vj ,v∗
E[w⊺j x∗]
}
=
1
n
∑
j :vj =v∗
∥xj ∥2=
∑
j :vj =v∗1
n
= f (v∗).
To compute the variance Var( fˆ (v∗)), we condition on random bits
chosenbyusers. Let r= (r1,...,r j ,...,rn )be a vector,wherer j ∈ [m] rep-
resents the random bit chosen by user j . By the law of total variance,
Var(fˆ (v∗))=E[Var(fˆ (v∗) | r)]+Var(E[fˆ (v∗) | r])
=
1
n2
E
[
Var
( n∑
j=1
w[r j ] ·x∗[r j ] | r j
) ]
+
1
n2
Var
(
E
[ n∑
j=1
w[r j ] ·x∗[r j ] | r j
] )
=
1
n2
(E[A]+Var(B)). (6)
The first term is
A=
n∑
j=1
Var(w[r j ] | r j ) ·x∗[r j ]2
=
∑
j :vj =v∗
Var(w[r j ]) ·x∗[r j ]2+
∑
j :vj ,v∗
Var(w[r j ]) ·x∗[r j ]2
=
∑
j :vj =v∗
(
c2m2x[r j ]2(p+q)−m2x[r j ]2
) ·x∗[r j ]2
+
∑
j :vj ,v∗
2c2mθ ·x∗[r j ]2,
and
E[A]=nf (v∗) · 1
m
(
c2m2(p+q)
m∑
i=1
xj [i]4−m2
m∑
i=1
xj [i]4
)
+n(1−f (v∗) · 1
m
·2c2mθ
m∑
i=1
x∗[i]2
=nf (v∗){c2(p+q)−1}+n(1−f (v∗)) ·2c2θ . (7)
The second term is
B=
n∑
j=1
E
[
w[r j ] ·c(v∗)[r j ] | r j
]
=
∑
j :vj =v∗
E
[
w[r j ]
] ·x∗[r j ]+ ∑
j :vj ,v∗
E
[
w[r j ]
] ·x∗[r j ]
=
∑
j :vj =v∗
cmx[r j ]2(p−q)=nf (v∗) ·cmx[r j ]2(p−q),
and
Var(B)=n2f (v∗)2c2m2(p−q)2Var(x[r j ]4)=0. (8)
Plugging (7) and (8) into (6) gives the claimed result. □
Theorem 1. Algorithm 3 satisfies (εHH+εOLH)-differential privacy.
Proof. Fix a user j and two itemsvj ,v ′j ∈V held by j. Observe
that, inAlgorithm2, for anyfixed sequenceH of hash functions each
user j makes a report toKT channels, and each report is generated
independently. Among K channels, there exists only one channel
on which user j sends the noisy report of her true itemvj . On the
remaining K − 1, user j sends the noisy report of a special item 0.
Thus, changing the user’s item fromvj tov ′j changes the distribution
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Figure 8: Telephone number distribution of a sample day. Striped bars are
related to phone numbers that receivedmore than 100 complaints.
of user’s report on atmost 2T channels, and on each channel the ratio
of twodistributions is boundedby exp( εHH2T )by the ε-LDPproperty of
the extended randomizer. Since user’s reports over separate channels
are independent, the corresponding ratio over all theKT channels
are bounded by exp( 2T εHH2T )=exp(εHH). For frequency oracle, user j
generates another report usingOLH, which satisfies εOLH-LDP, and
sends it to the server. Again, by independence of user’s reports for
heavyhitter detectionand frequencyoracle, the ratio of user’s output
distribution is bounded by exp(εHH)·exp(εOLH)=exp(εHH+εOLH).
This completes the proof. □
Proposition 1. The frequency estimate fˆ (v) of an itemv given by
Rext has lower variance than that given by Rbas if
ε ≥ lna+
√
9a2−20a+12
1−a ,
where a= f (v), i.e., the true frequency ofv .
Proof. Using the parameters in (5), we get the variance of fre-
quency estimate fˆ (v) given by the extended randomizer:
Var(fˆ (v))= 1
n
{
f (v) ·(c2(p+q)−1)+(1−f (v)) ·2c2θ }
=
1
n
{
f (v) ·
(
3(eε −1)
(eε −1)2
)
+
2(eε +2)
(eε −1)2
}
. (9)
The variance of fˆ (v) for the basic randomizer is
Var(fˆ (v))= 1
n
{(
eε +1
eε −1
)2
−f (v)
}
. (10)
To find the values of ε such that (9)≤ (10), we set
f (v)
(
3(eε −1)
(eε −1)2
)
+
2(eε +2)
(eε −1)2 ≤
(
eε +1
eε −1
)2
− f (v).
Simplifying and rearranging the terms, the above inequality reduces
to
(f (v)−1)e2ε +f (v)eε +(3−2f (v)) ≤ 0. (11)
Substituting t = eε and a = f (v), we see that the l.h.s. term of the
above inequality is a simple quadratic function д(t)= (a−1)t2+at+
(3−2a), where 0≤a<1. The quadratic functionд is concave and has
zeros at
t =
a±
√
a2−4(a−1)(3−2a)
1−a .
Thus, the inequality (11) is satisfied when
ε ≥ lna+
√
9a2−20a+12
1−a .
□
02
/1
7/
16
02
/1
9/
16
02
/2
1/
16
02
/2
3/
16
02
/2
5/
16
02
/2
7/
16
02
/2
9/
16
03
/0
2/
16
03
/0
4/
16
03
/0
6/
16
03
/0
8/
16
03
/1
0/
16
03
/1
2/
16
03
/1
4/
16
03
/1
6/
16
Day
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
R
ep
or
ts
Figure9:NumberofdailycomplaintsreceivedbetweenFeb.17thandMar.17th.
E DATASET PROPERTIES
Figure 8 shows the relative frequency of phone numbers that make
more thanonehundredcalls in aday, compared to the total numberof
calls made by all phone numbers reported within the same area code.
These graphs are computed based on phone numbers extracted from
unwanted call reports from US residents to the FTC (more details
about the FTC data we use are provided in Section 5). Each vertical
bar indicates a different area code prefix. The striped portion of the
bars indicates the relative fraction of complaints related to numbers
that were complained about more than one hundred times in a day.
The figure is related to a sample dayworth of reports. As can be seen,
phone numberswithmore than one hundred complaints appear only
in a limited number of prefixes. Their relative occurrence frequency
is high in their respective area codes, whereas it would be diluted
if we considered all 10-digit numbers in just one bucket.
Figure 9 depicts the number of valid reports received each day,
showing a weekly pattern in which a much lower number of com-
plaints is received around the weekends. Figure 10 shows the dis-
tribution of the number of complaints per caller ID. Specifically,
the x-axis lists the number of complaints, and they-axis show how
many phone numbers have received x complaints in a single day,
throughout the entire period of observation included in the dataset.
It is easy to see that the vast majority of phone numbers received
a single daily complaint, but there also exist many phone numbers
that received hundreds of complaints in a single day.
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Figure 10: Distribution of daily complaints per caller ID.
15
